














From Ideals to Implementation: 















Department of Political Science 
Professor Alexander Cooley 




	   1 
Table of Contents 
 
I. Introduction…………………………………………………..………………………………..2 
II. Literature Review…………………………………………………..………………………….8 
a. Early Norm Theory 
b. Contemporary Norm Theory 
c. Norm Localization 
d. Locating a New Approach 
III. Why “Health For All” Failed: 1978-1980s……………………………………..……………19 
a. The WHO Campaigns for Social Justice 
b. Neoliberal Resistance 
c. Mexico’s First Reform: Decentralization (1980s) 
IV. Progress Toward Universal Coverage: 2000-present……………………………………..…28 
a. The WHO Casts a Different Vision 
b. Signs of Change at the World Bank 




	   2 
“We thus find ourselves at a crossroads: health care can be considered a commodity to be sold, 
or it can be considered a basic social right.” 
– Paul Farmer, Pathologies of Power 
 
ABSTRACT The world is witnessing a groundbreaking transition to universal health coverage. 
Yet few researchers have explained why nations as distinct as Rwanda and Thailand, for 
example, have chosen to implement universal coverage within the last decade or so. An analysis 
of international politics can help illuminate why the idea that everyone has a right to health has 
materialized into concrete health policies. This paper argues that both international norm 
construction and domestic conditions of individual states influence whether or not countries 
adopt universal health coverage. As a principle norm creator and agenda setter, the World Health 
Organization’s (WHO) pragmatic, evidence-based framing of universal coverage has enabled it 
to make a strong argument for UHC. Rather than characterize the WHO as the sole determinant 
of the transition to UHC, this paper asserts that it serves a catalytic role in shaping countries’ 
decisions to reform their health systems—global and local limitations also constrain its mandate. 
National governments have unique economic and political conditions that work to enable or 
disable policy change. Thus, the powerful convergence of effective norm construction in 
international networks and greater local capacity has encouraged countries across the globe to 




Margaret Chan, the current Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), 
claims that “universal health coverage is the single most powerful concept that public health has 
to offer.”1	  Although universal health care first originated in Europe, today an increasing number 
of low and middle-income nations are reforming their health care policies and implementing 
universal health coverage (UHC). While the first wave of reform emerged after World War II, a 
new “wave”2 or “global health transition”3 is taking place across the world. With the exception 
of the United States, the 25 wealthiest countries in the world have universal health care, and now 
countries like Vietnam, Mali, and Colombia are making progress toward universal coverage. 
Almost every low and middle-income country today is currently “engaged in some reform to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “WHO | Sixty-fifth World Health Assembly.” 
2 Ahoobim et al., The New Global Health Agenda: Universal Health Coverage, 1. 
3 Rodin and De Ferranti, “Universal Health Coverage.” 
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expand access to care and improve financial protection.”4  Nations such as India, China, 
Indonesia, and South Africa are part of this movement. If successful in their implementation, 
these four countries alone could provide health coverage for 40% of the global population.5 
Given these sweeping changes, the major puzzle that emerges concerns the cause of the dynamic 
momentum building for UHC as an international norm. The drivers behind its prevalence in the 
last decade or so are not obvious, especially given the global economic recession, convoluted 
governance of global health, and absence of universal health care in the United States. While 
several authors have described the how part of the UHC phenomenon, far fewer have explained 
the why. 
One of the most convincing potential explanations involves a correlation between a 
nation’s economic growth and demand or implementation of UHC. The “health financing 
transition,” or rise in health spending per capita and pooled health expenditures, was observed in 
126 countries between 1995 and 2009. 	  Health financing becomes increasingly relevant as 
countries develop, and some could argue that the rise in income and increased economic ability 
for people to purchase health insurance pushes countries toward universal coverage.6 Yet the 
health financing transition does not ensure the implementation of health reform. The U.S. has 
witnessed a rise in per capita health spending from $148 to $7,668 from 1960 to 2008 in 
comparison to Japan, which rose from $171 to $2690. Even in the U.S., 85% of that rise was due 
to pooled expenditures from public programs.7 Despite these trends, the U.S. lacks universal 
health care. Thus, the global financing transition provides a related, but incomplete picture of the 
UHC transition. Furthermore, while economic factors influence policy change, the pure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Savedoff et al., “Transitions in Health Financing and Policies for Universal Coverage,” 23. 
5 Ahoobim et al., The New Global Health Agenda: Universal Health Coverage, 1. 
6 Ibid., 2. 
7 Savedoff et al., “Transitions in Health Financing and Policies for Universal Coverage,” 4-8. 
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economic explanation fails to explain why low-income governments such as Rwanda, the 
Philippines, and Bangladesh exhibit national health insurance programs.8 Historically, countries 
like the United Kingdom have achieved universal coverage with low levels of economic 
development.9 Furthermore, the world remains entrenched in a system of economic 
globalization, neoliberalism, and growing inequality. The macroeconomic state of the modern 
world favors privatization and market-oriented policymaking, rather than social protection.  
To begin to delve into the causes of the current global movement, researchers should 
instead look toward an explanation based on international politics. Health systems as well as 
health outcomes are produced through political processes—all health is inherently political. 
Mckee et al., a group of established global health policy researchers, explain that there is no 
singular explanation for UHC. Rather, they present a multifaceted theory based on five 
determinants of UHC: the strength of organized labor, economic resources, societal division, 
existing institutions, and windows of opportunity.10 While these factors examine local processes, 
their argument could better link them to international influences. Through a new approach, this 
paper proposes that theoretical frameworks based on norms offer a cogent analysis of health 
reform as it pertains to the connection between global and local. Many would consider universal 
coverage a mere health financing mechanism, but it contains many more social and political 
nuances. UHC can be considered a norm because of its intrinsic ideological underpinnings: it 
expresses the fundamental human right to health and seeks to put the concept of global health 
equity into practice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ahoobim et al., The New Global Health Agenda: Universal Health Coverage, 2. 
9 McKee et al., “Universal Health Coverage,” 3. 
10 McKee et al., “Universal Health Coverage.” 
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In terms of international human rights law, the idea of universal access to health care is 
not new. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) declares, “everyone 
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family.” This spawned Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which states that everyone has a right to “the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health.”11 As the World Health Organization defines it, health is “a state of 
complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease.”12 In 
other words, public health addresses whole populations and the social, economic, and political 
dimensions of health. The right to health does not imply “state handouts” free from individual 
accountability; rather, it argues that humans deserve to lead healthy lives and exist in healthy 
societal conditions. It is also enshrined in the WHO’s Constitution (1948), demonstrating its 
centrality to the WHO’s underlying ideology.13 As the Lancet explains, the right to health 
materializes into a concrete reality through the multifaceted aspects of health systems.14 Hence, a 
sociopolitical or normative analysis is essential to a study of health systems and health reform. 
In 1978, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched a campaign for primary health 
care under the slogan, “Health for All by 2000.” Under this banner, the WHO argued that all 
people deserved access to a basic level of health services and standards. This was to be achieved 
through holistic restructuring of public health systems and social structures outside of the health 
sector. This agenda of the early 1980s failed in most respects, as most countries lacked the 
capacity to implement UHC. Almost the opposite of its original vision, the “selective primary 
health care” agenda replaced primary health care and instead identified four vertical health 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Marks, Health and Human Rights: Basic International Documents, 37. 
12 Mann et al., Health and Human Rights: A Reader, 9. 
13 “Constitution of the World Health Organization.” 
14 Backman et al., “Health Systems and the Right to Health.” 
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interventions that ultimately lacked effectiveness in terms of health outcomes.15 These four were 
growth monitoring, oral rehydration therapy, breastfeeding, and immunization (GOBI). The 
politicized promotion of Health for All encountered a resistant ideology of neoliberal policies in 
the 1980s that derailed the WHO’s agenda. In contrast, the current UHC agenda appears to have 
successfully taken root worldwide. Even if the systems themselves remain imperfect, many 
governments are engaged in the process of reform. What makes these two campaigns, primary 
health care and UHC, different? How can these differences help explain why the world is 
internationalizing universal coverage?  
The central research question I propose is: why is the world experiencing a global 
transition to universal health coverage? This poses a distinct question from the numerous 
studies16-­‐17	  on the waves of European health reform, which began in 1948. The present research 
question rather addresses the current rise of UHC in a diversity of nations, and embeds the 
unexpected nature of its timing. To answer this question, I will adopt an analysis that positions 
international institutions as key actors in normative networks. Almost all explanations of the 
political aspects of UHC evoke, even if through unintentional means, the WHO’s authoritative 
role in promoting UHC. Although the WHO serves as a primary architect of this movement, it 
relies on the ideals and action of its Member States. Its Member States each contain specific 
limitations, opportunities, and complexities. Thus, this campaign takes on a transnational 
character that pervades both global and local spaces. 
To explore how norm diffusion operates for universal health coverage, I propose the 
below visual analytic (see Figure 1) to explain how the normative ideas of the WHO promote 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Magnussen, Ehiri, and Jolly, “Comprehensive Versus Selective Primary Health Care,” 170. 
16 Bump, The Long Road to Universal Health Coverage. 
17 Social Health Insurance Systems in Western Europe. 
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health reform. The WHO frames norms that enter a global environment of additional ideas and 
competing norms; with sufficient domestic political, economic, and institutional abilities, nations 
may then adopt particular normative frameworks and put them into practice though the 
implementation of UHC. The messages and actions of international actors, such as the WHO and 
the World Bank can activate or inhibit this process. For this reason, they serve as norm catalysts. 
While the first box emphasizes the role of international institutions (and gate keepers within 
those institutions), the second and third boxes indicate agency of national governments. This 
graphic representation is not meant to suggest a deterministic linearity free from norm blockage, 
but rather illustrate the connection between global and local levels of norm realization. 
 







Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to note the difference between “universal health 
coverage” and “universal health care.” Universal health care tends to apply to developed 
countries, whereas universal health coverage tends to concern developing countries. This is 
because “care” implies a wider array of health services, while “coverage” implies a more basic 
standard of coverage for the population. Stuckler et al define universal health coverage as “the 
existence of a legal mandate for universal access services” and evidence of this access for the 
Global: norm 
construction + framing 
Local conditions: 
political commitment 
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majority of the population.18 According to the WHO, universal health coverage (UHC) ensures 
“that all people can use the promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health services they 
need, of sufficient quality to be effective” without exposing themselves to severe financial 
hardship.19 The term universal health coverage encompasses a vast array of health care policies 
and systems, but includes common features like efficient use of resources, risk-pooling and 
financial protection, and equity in access to health services. Another broad term, “health 
system,” refers to various pieces such as the health workforce, financing mechanism, 
information, health facilities, medicines, and technologies that create the overall health 
infrastructure in society. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 A possible way to understand this case would consist of an examination of power politics 
within international organizations, especially with regard to the United States as a potential norm 
blocker. This would fall under a realist framework. UHC presents an opportunity to explore a 
social method of analysis, however, because the U.S. appears to have played a more passive role 
than expected. I will address this briefly throughout the comparison of the two campaigns. 
Because the lack of U.S. power politics and of a satisfactory realist explanation justifies a turn 
toward social theories, I will introduce two major categories of norm theory, early and 
contemporary. (The latter also includes the idea of “norm localization.”) Norm theorists have 
applied their theories to a wide range of topics, such as gender and strategic frames,20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Stuckler et al., The Political Economy of Universal Health Coverage. 
19 “WHO | What Is Universal Coverage?”  
20 Carpenter, “‘Women, Children and Other Vulnerable Groups’.” 
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corporations in conflict zones,21 and the role of Amnesty International in shaping the standards 
of human rights.22 The first series of theorists developed models of norms that were instrumental 
at the time, but later challenged by a second body of more contemporary theorists. One reason to 
classify the time period in which these theories emerged is that the globalization and 
modernization of the world has largely affected how norms arise and take shape. The original 
and more modern authors of norm theory differ in the forces, actors, and causal mechanisms 
used to explain how international norms operate.  
 After engaging with the relevant theories for a study of universal coverage, I explain how 
my analysis serves to both counter and expand upon them. The case of universal coverage 
prompts questions about which types of norm theory can explain variance over time. Given the 
non-linear nature of its emergence, I find that UHC complicates the classic model of the “norm 
life cycle” because it has not followed a straightforward ascendancy. Using the ideas of “norm 
entrepreneurship” and “gate keeping,” I evaluate the WHO in its embodiment of both in the 
1980s and 2000s, respectively. A significant aspect of my analysis employs the idea of “framing” 
and the tactics that the WHO uses to craft its agenda. Finally, an analysis of the domestic factors 
involved require additional theoretical understandings, which I will explore through a more 
detailed case study of Mexico.  
 
Early Norm Theory 
 Finnemore and Sikkink, two of the most influential norm theorists, define a norm as a 
“standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” and an international norm as a 
standard of appropriate state behavior. Ruggie writes that norms are “social facts” with a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Haufler, “Corporations in Zones of Conflict: Issues, Actors, and Institutions.” 
22 Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience. 
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“legitimate social purpose.”23 Norms serve several functions, such as to organize the 
international space or to elicit certain changes or actions in the way actors behave. The authors 
emphasize this constructive nature of norm dynamics, in that they create social transformation 
and influence the international system. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, norms carry a 
quality of “oughtness.” While this aspect of normative action is important, the authors fail to 
consider how norms not only produce, but also reveal commonly held beliefs. Norms also reflect 
certain values and characteristics of a society that may have emerged through organic or 
historical means. Thus, a definition of an international norm must consider how it serves both 
reflexive and prescriptive functions.  
Following such definitions, Finnemore and Sikkink establish the basis for conventional 
norm theory with their work on “norm entrepreneurs”24-25 and the “norm life cycle.” They 
outline a three-stage process in which norms travel through phases of norm emergence, cascade, 
and internalization. Norm entrepreneurs work to create or draw attention to issues, oftentimes 
first from a domestic base and through some sort of organizational platform. They serve as the 
source of norm emergence and are motivated by a higher moral purpose. Eventually, norms 
reach a critical threshold of acceptance, deemed the “tipping point.” Each of these stages 
contains its own set of relevant actors, motives, and dominant mechanisms.26 The relationship 
between norm entrepreneurs and international institutions is somewhat unclear; even though they 
argue institutions can serve as the “organizational platform,” elsewhere they claim that they are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization. 
24 Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes,” 482. 
25 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders. 
26 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 898. 
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“not tailored to norm promotion.”27 In the case of UHC, international institutions—the WHO and 
the World Bank in particular—have played a fundamental role in norm promotion and advocacy. 
While Finnemore and Sikkink provide a rich explanation for norm formation, one 
essential limitation of the life cycle theory rests in its inability to explain more convoluted paths 
to norm creation and realization. The linear trajectory of emergence to internalization that these 
authors propose does not acknowledge the ebb and flow of a single norm. The norm life cycle 
cannot illuminate why UHC has experienced periods of international attention and disregard. It is 
possible that UHC could conceptually have fit into certain stages at different points in history, 
but it has not unraveled from a clear entrepreneurial campaign to a “taken for granted” quality 
across the world. 
 
Contemporary Norm Theory 
 In response to this major theoretical framework, myriad other scholars have cited, 
refuted, and engaged with its tenets. Carpenter and Bob provide an expansion of normative 
modes of thought, in particular through their discussion of “norm gatekeepers.” In essence, 
Carpenter argues that norm entrepreneurs are not the only actor involved. She defines norm 
gatekeepers as “pre-existing, influential, credible organizations within an advocacy sphere who 
“adopt” new issues” or choose not to.28 In Carpenter’s analysis, certain actors have a specific, 
powerful ability to select and reject certain issues presented to them, which in turn shape their 
agendas. A gatekeeper can be an individual person within a gatekeeping organization. Carpenter 
explains that “issue adoption occurs when the issue is championed by at least one major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid., 900. 
28 Carpenter, “Governing the Global Agenda: ‘Gate-keepers’ and ‘Issue Adoption’ in Transnational 
Advocacy Networks,” Who Governs the Globe (2010): 202. 
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player.”29 Entrepreneurs seek to turn problems they identify into issues that gatekeepers insert 
into the transnational advocacy network’s mainstream discourse. This represents a very early 
stage that serves as prerequisite for a subsequent campaign and establishment of the norm. 
In contrast to more conventional claims, Carpenter complicates the categorization of 
where norm entrepreneurs and influential gatekeepers come from. Rather than assert that they are 
NGOs and international organizations, respectively, the converse can also occur. The challenges, 
patterns, and politics of the agents behind norm construction influence how certain ideas are 
promoted in the international arena. Ideas do not exist in isolation, but are rather attached to 
specific groups and institutions.30 The way Carpenter critically examines the diversity of power 
structures will prove significant for the example of the WHO, which exhibits some but not all 
qualities of a norm gatekeeper. The analysis of WHO that follows its action in two distinct 
campaigns will specify and contextualize these characteristics. 
A central part of the discussion on how gatekeepers advocate for the issues they adopt 
involves how these agents frame their ideas. Issues used for political purposes do not exist as 
objective truths, but rather as a strategically molded ideas aimed to resonate with specific 
audiences. An extensive body of literature addresses this topic. A frame is a “persuasive device 
used to ‘fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their 
identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing problems.’”31 A simpler definition 
claims that a frame reflects how an issue is conveyed and understood by the public.32 Frames 
employ rhetorical tools to encourage a specific normative goal or change. Examining how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid., 209. 
30 Haufler, “Corporations in Zones of Conflict: Issues, Actors, and Institutions,” 111. 
31 Payne, “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction,” 39. 
32 Shiffman, “A Social Explanation for the Rise and Fall of Global Health Issues,” 609. 
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advocates use frames involves understanding the importance of communication and 
interpretation. 
Theorists hold various opinions of why some frames and issues rise and others fail. 
Nadelmann, Bob, and Price have argued that certain qualities of issues are more likely to gain 
international attention.33 Keck and Sikkink also note the importance of intrinsic “issue 
attributes,” which Carpenter challenges with the idea of “issue concordance” or inter-network 
linkage between issues.34 Another rationalization stems from the idea norms’ relationship to 
others in the so-called “pool,”35 and the extent to which new norms resonate with existing ones. 
Perhaps more directly relevant to issues of health care, Bob discusses these mechanisms in the 
context of human rights. He argues that human rights issues are more likely to garner support if 
they fit within a category of abuses that is already considered legitimate, such as civil and 
political rights as opposed to social rights.36 
Applied to global health, framing and other ideational concepts become relevant when 
questioning which global health issues emerge or remain invisible. This methodology assumes 
that items on the international agenda have social underpinnings in addition to material 
incentives. Framing, agenda setting, and priming have already been discussed in depth in terms 
of media and communication.37 One of the few authors to link agenda setting and global health, 
Reich defines the “international health policy agenda as the policy issues most vigorously 
promoted by the major international agencies in health.”38 Shiffman also establishes a valuable 
framework for why particular global health issues rise and fall, and underscores the necessity of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Carpenter, “Governing the Global Agenda,” 225. 
34 Carpenter, “Governing the Global Agenda.” 
35 Florini, Sentā, and Peace, The Third Force. 
36 Bob, “Globalization and the Social Construction of Human Rights Campaigns,” 136. 
37 Weaver, “Thoughts on Agenda Setting, Framing, and Priming.” 
38 Reich, “The Politics of Agenda Setting in International Health,” 490.
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accompanying institutions to help issues ascend and remain on the international agenda. He 
argues that successful health policy communities are those that use frames that both resonate 
with elites and benefit from the backing of established institutions.39 Others have examined how 
discourse effects change in global health policy in other ways, for example by looking at how a 
shift from state-to-state interactions to global health partnerships occurred.40 Shaping ideas and 




While Carpenter and other explanations discussed thus far provide useful insights about 
the initial creation of normative agendas, other theories are needed to explain the connection 
between norm diffusion and actual political change. As Gutner writes, the link between what 
occurs “upstream” in the realm of idea propagation and what transcribes “downstream” in the 
area of outcomes can break.41 Or, the attempt to link the two can fail from the outset. The 
conditions that enable recipient states to take an international norm and turn it into a reality for 
its specific population represents a crucial aspect of a normative analysis. Although it can 
certainly change state behavior, the current global regime structure lacks sufficient formal 
mechanisms of enforcement. The international human rights project clearly exemplifies this. No 
matter how international norms are disseminated, they are limited by whether or not states 
choose to put them into practice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Shiffman, “A Social Explanation for the Rise and Fall of Global Health Issues,” 608. 
40 Harmer, “Understanding Change in Global Health Policy.” 
41 Gutner, “When ‘Doing Good’ Does Not: The IMF and the Millennium Development Goals,” 267. 
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 Seeking to address this neglected element of norm construction, Acharya proposes a 
theory of “norm localization.” He stresses that analyses must look “beyond international 
prescriptions” and instead focus on the “role of domestic political, organizational, and cultural 
variables in conditions the reception of new global norms.”42 Acharya defines localization as the 
process in which local actors interpret and modify international norms to suit their domestic 
identities. This process also involves the techniques of framing and the use of issue congruence, 
as local actors must ensure that global ideas are congruent with established local customs. This 
pivot toward a consideration of domestic factors emphasizes the power dynamics and constraints 
of states or regional groups, whereas previous theories highlighted how international norms 
emanated from the top. The conditions for norm localization that he identifies remain somewhat 
vague and difficult to measure. Nevertheless, Acharya makes an important contribution to the 
literature by emphasizing the contextual factors that affect the likelihood of localization, an idea 
that asserts a more realistic explanation for how international norms hinge on local capability.  
  
Locating a New Approach 
Because the academic literature on how global systems work requires a new space to 
“accommodate the diversity and creativity of activity”43 in international networks today, I plan to 
develop an approach that engages with theory as it connects to the dynamism of the real world. I 
choose to situate this paper within the kind of norm theory that focuses on “agency rather than 
structure,”44 an approach that begins to pick apart the specific levers of change and action. 
Actors, and the contexts they are shaped by, evolve over time to accommodate the rising tide of 
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various social undercurrents throughout the world. Blanket theories that seek to explain the 
international system as a defined set of roles and behaviors presents a rigid picture of a world 
that is much more fluid and volatile in actuality. Political scientists must not only seek to 
examine patterns, but also embrace the complexity associated with power and social change. For 
this reason, a concentrated study of the WHO and UHC may bring theory to life without 
determining a definite model applicable to every sphere of norm dissemination. 
Part of the central puzzle addressed here revolves around why a norm for universal health 
coverage has gained wave-like momentum over the past decade or so in comparison to earlier 
periods of history. Thus, I will compare and contrast two WHO initiatives that involved a 
recommendation for UHC: the Primary Health Care movement called “Health for All by 2000” 
and the most recent “health financing” for UHC approach. This approach will provide an 
alternative to the linear norm life cycle and typical trajectories of norm theorists, because the 
same norm has assumed quite different forms across both periods. The Health for All proposition 
was not nearly as successful as the WHO’s involvement in establishing UHC systems in recent 
history. Comparing the two will allow certain lessons about how norms change over time, as 
well as what factors seem more successful in prompting health reform. Thus, this paper will offer 
a complication of Finnemore and Sikkink’s original theory.  
In examining these two initiatives, I will first locate my analysis within the “upstream” 
realm of norm construction. Examining the key differences between Health for All and today’s 
UHC movement will require a close examination of the WHO as the primary actor. I challenge 
the notion of institutions as passive conduits for the work of advocates and networks. Adding to 
the more recent era of norm theorists, I seek to muddy the distinction between entrepreneur and 
norm gatekeeper, grassroots advocacy group and agenda setter. In line with Shiffman, I argue 
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that the WHO plays a vital role in agenda setting for global health. Specifically, I identify the 
Director-Generals of the WHO as the actors with entrepreneurial or gate keeping qualities, 
because they serve as the face of the organization and ultimately control how the organization 
chooses its issues and disseminates norms. Like other international institutions, it has its own 
internal issues of importance that it must shape and reshape. Therefore, I plan to look at how the 
WHO’s framing and strategic rhetoric enabled or hindered a worldwide norm for universal 
coverage. The WHO’s leadership has also played a role in voicing their vision, setting a certain 
tone, and shaping their institutional mandate. The techniques of issue resonance with pre-existing 
standards and other modifications have impacted its ability to gain credibility within members of 
the international community. Instead of focusing on one set of actors that seek to cause an 
authority or institution to adopt an issue, I will categorize the WHO as an institution that itself 
diffuses carefully calculated norms. The WHO occupies a unique catalytic space, one that is 
neither fully activist nor institutional in the classic sense. 
The other side of the equation—that which involves norm localization, domestic 
capacity, and political will—also merits consideration. An emblem of the limits of global 
governance, the WHO prescribes agendas without any guarantee that recipient states will 
transform them into new health policy. The success of the agenda relies on how states interpret 
that agenda and how they can implement policy given various national political and institutional 
environments. States translate the rhetoric of international institutions into concrete change. For 
this reason, I will examine the political and socioeconomic factors that seem conducive to UHC. 
The political forces, interactions with other international players, and basic institutional capacity 
differ across time. Further, the economic status and potential in recipient states also impacts 
whether or not a norm for UHC becomes localized. Finally, the social aspect must also be 
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considered, as it exists in a dynamic relationship with international agenda setters and norm 
diffusers. While states emerge as a product of their individual histories and cultures, international 
standards may also influence the social framework that governments at least claims to embody. 
The domestic social landscape may or may not align with their government’s platform. 
Although I argue that a broad wave of normative change is occurring, the use of a case 
study can help contextualize these changes in more depth. To examine how both the WHO and 
domestic conditions affect whether or not states reform to universal coverage, I will examine 
Mexico’s history of health reform and the impetus behind its transition to UHC. Mexico presents 
a fascinating case for various reasons. First, a national health insurance program called Seguro 
Popular was introduced in 2003 and reached completion in 2012; over 50 million Mexicans are 
on track to gain access to comprehensive health services with financial protection.45 Thus, this 
reform offers an example of change that has occurred in the most recent wave of the past decade. 
Second, the Mexican government seems particularly impacted by the WHO. It has not only 
located itself within the normative framework of the right to health and UHC, but also is now 
itself becoming an important voice and advocate. The relationship between Mexico and the 
WHO will reveal important lessons about how norms are produced through interactions between 
states and international institutions. 
In the following pages, I will use research from political science and health policy 
journals, reports and documents from the WHO, and other secondary sources. I will consult 
pieces from The Lancet as well as articles written by the WHO Director-Generals. Meeting notes 
or transcripts from international meetings and conferences also appear. First, this paper will 
provide relevant background on the WHO as a global actor. Then, the general architecture will 
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consist of a comparison between Health for All (1980s) and the current UHC campaign, each 
contextualized through a close examination of Mexico. 
A few limitations and assumptions of this paper need to be acknowledged. First, I assume 
that a government choosing to reform its health system to one of universal coverage means that it 
has adopted and realized this norm. Further, the effectiveness of the various models of UHC as 
methods of improving health outcomes and reducing inequality lies outside the scope of this 
paper. It is also impossible to draw a direct causal linkage between various factors or actions and 
the decision-making of governments. A conflux of factors determine why states reform their 
policies; however, I hope to provide some evidence as to factors and events that likely play a 
significant role if not a definite causal claim. Finally, the selected case of Mexico is not 
representative of all countries choosing to reform. The path to universal coverage is complex and 
distinct across countries. Nevertheless, a case study helps raise questions about the possible 
patterns and experiences that states may share. 
  
III. Why Health for All Failed: 1978-1980s 
This section will examine the campaign for Primary Health Care that the WHO instigated 
in 1978. I suggest that its framing as a social justice issue had negative consequences, which 
combined with other international factors caused the demise of its principles in favor of a 
completely opposite approach. The unraveling of the Alma-Ata initiative demonstrates the 
limitations of the WHO as a norm catalyzer and agenda setter, in that its constricted authority 
requires it to make more calculated decisions about how to disseminate its messages and compel 
governments to undertake health reform. The empirical data on UHC is quite limited for this 
time period, and the WHO lacks a list of countries with its definition of UHC. Stuckler et al., 
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however, indicate that a group of wealthier European nations, including a few outliers such as 
Japan and Panama, implemented UHC prior to 1980. Within their set of 44 countries they 
determined have UHC, just a few examples of health reform existed during the 1980s in 
countries such as Canada and Greece.46 The failure of Health for All and lack of UHC 
implementation correlates with the politicization of the WHO and supremacy of neoliberalism of 
that era. 
 
The WHO Campaigns for Social Justice 
 When countries gained independence from colonial powers in the 1960s and 1970s, they 
faced new challenges with regard to their ability improve the health systems of their populations. 
Most of these nations faced an extreme disease burden, and the health status of rural populations 
in particular began to decline in some places.47 At the time, international health agencies were 
pursing a vertical strategy of specific disease eradication, for example by focusing on smallpox, 
malaria, and yaws. Despite some successes, such as smallpox eradication, health outcomes 
continued to worsen throughout the 1970s as health spending increased.48 Because the WHO 
recognized that this fragmented strategy was not working, they developed a new comprehensive 
or “horizontal” approach to public health. Tending more toward community-based models like 
those evidenced in China’s “barefoot doctors,” the WHO moved away from disease-specific 
programs. More grassroots methods of delivering health care to the rural poor began to challenge 
traditional mechanisms of the delivery of services, and were resulting in positive improvements. 
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 In 1978, the WHO redefined their fundamental vision for global health through the 
Declaration of Alma-Ata, a written document that the WHO Member States adopted at the 
International Conference on Primary Health Care in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan. Through unanimous 
agreement among its Member States, the WHO outlined an alternate agenda that prioritized 
primary health care (PHC), a plan that called for universal accessibility and coverage, prevention 
and health promotion, and cross-sector collaboration to address the root social, political, and 
economic causes of poor health.49 A few of the goals it advocated for included universal 
coverage of basic service like health education, adequate clean water and food security, and 
improved maternal and child health; essentially, Alma-Ata placed several broad agenda items of 
public health at once. The WHO sought to define a certain standard of health as the basic right of 
people everywhere, and argued that societies needed to address social ills outside of the health 
sector alone to guarantee that right. Despite the validity of PHC as a health intervention, the 
WHO was unable to establish a rights-based philosophy for international health.  
 The principle role of the Director-General at the time, Halfdan T. Mahler, complicates the 
distinction between outside entrepreneur and international organization. As discussed earlier, 
contemporary norm theorists such as Carpenter distinguish between issue definition by norm 
entrepreneurs and issue adoption by major human rights organizations.50 Mahler, however, 
possessed both qualities as an entrepreneurial figure that sought to change the status quo from 
the inside of an organization. With the goal of reducing health inequities across the world, he 
proposed the goal of “Health for All by 2000” in 1976 at the World Health Assembly. There, he 
said, “Many social evolutions and revolutions have taken place because the social structures 
were crumbling,” and that the structures of public health were crumbling. A leader with charisma 	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and “missionary zeal,” he felt that “social justice” was a “holy word.” His ideological fervor 
shone through in his speech and writings, which were titled things like “Health and Justice” 
(1978), “The Political Struggle for Health (1978), “The Meaning of Health for All by the Year 
2000.”51 Mahler and the WHO then assumed an entrepreneurial role by championing this claim 
and launch the issue into the international normative network for health and human rights.  
Mahler’s politicization of the PHC agenda revealed how easily the WHO could 
characterize itself as a political actor, a label that has served to the detriment of the WHO’s 
legitimacy. Primary health care as it was envisioned in the late 1970s and early 1980s was “an 
adjunct to social revolution,” and Mahler was “blamed for transforming the WHO from a 
technical into a politicized organization.”52 Because Mahler’s overtly political message did not 
resonate with them, politicians and development experts derailed the Health for All campaign 
and ushered in an alternative “Selective Primary Health Care” approach.53 The narrow, vertical 
program strategy surged again, as the advocates of the selective model claimed that a 
comprehensive reform program was too idealistic. His leadership at the WHO constructed the 
international norm of universal health as a highly ideological matter, a strategy that soon failed.  
The rise in selective PHC over Health for All emerged not only because of Mahler’s 
framing issue, but also because of the power of other competing global frames. These 
interventions emphasized cost-effectiveness rather than social justice, and the dream for health 
equity disintegrated in the face of larger global events and shifts in ideologies. The norm that the 
WHO under Mahler tried to propagate eventually conflicted with its nemesis beginnings in the 
mid-1980s, as “the prominence of Third World interests began to be displaced by financial and 
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private sector involvement in international health.” The WHO’s framing issue was exacerbated 
by the “currency liberalization, stagflation, the oil and debt crises, and waning interest in 
overseas development assistance” that “opened the way for a major shift in development 
strategies.”54 Thus, Mahler and the top WHO executives who chose to pursue the PHC agenda as 
a progressive strategy deviated from the predominant ideological bent of the other norm-setters 
at the time. While theorists Keck and Sikkink focus on the inherent attributes of a norm, this 
example shows how the particular way that entrepreneurial actors like Mahler mobilize issues 
matters more than the issue itself. 
 
Neoliberal Resistance 
 A norm does not emerge insolation, but rather enters a global pool of other ideas and 
actors that can either benefit or hinder its claims. As the World Bank, other international 
financial institutions and development banks, and private sector interests gained influence, they 
disseminated free-market principles into the global health regime. Essentially in complete 
opposition to the Declaration of Alma-Ata, the World Bank outlined a normative agenda for 
privatization through influential reports such as Financing Health Services in Developing 
Countries.55 The World Bank possessed more resources and therefore more power, allowing it to 
emphasize the private sector’s place in health care delivery. Market-based ideas dominated a 
norm pool in which social and economic rights for the poor already lacked legitimacy, 
exacerbating primary health care’s ability to resonate. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the World Bank focused only on the health care sector (as 
opposed to the multi-sector change that PHC envisioned) and the economic benefit of better 	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health. In a 1987 report, the Bank advocated for the use of user fees, or the ability to charge 
patients, as a financing solution to shrinking public health budgets. Today, the public health 
community can present evidence of the ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and inequity of user fees.56 
Yet at the time, the scientific evidence and evaluation methods failed to demonstrate how PHC 
was making gains; this certainly did not help the WHO’s situation.57 If primary health care was 
an expression of health as a human right, the Bank’s hands-off, private sector-driven approach 
was just the opposite. With the oil and debt crises and structural adjustment programs, the 1980s 
became known as the “lost decade of development.”58 During this time, the international 
community not only rejected the WHO’s frame for its politics and idealism, but also other ideas 
and forces from competing institutions all converged to silence the WHO’s core message. 
The political nature of the WHO’s mandate at the time was powerful enough to upset 
policymakers in the U.S, who also stifled the ability for PHC to become the global approach to 
public health. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, expressed its concern for the 
WHO’s “anti-free enterprise rhetoric” in a 1985 report titled: The World Health Organization: 
Resisting Third World Ideological Pressures. Starrels, the author, discusses the fears of the 
Regan Administration about the political undertones inherent in the primary health care approach 
that deviate from its “technical” mandate. He also conveys anxiety about the relationship 
between WHO, the U.S., and the United Nations in general. Starrels concludes by saying that the 
“West has a political responsibility to WHO: to quietly and persistently insist that the 
Organization adhere to its technical mandate” and to refrain from politicization.59 While this 
report continues to mention that the U.S. still should support the WHO as a UN agency, it coveys 	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a weariness within the minds of U.S. policymakers. Therefore, both the U.S. and the World Bank 
expressed a philosophical opposition to Mahler’s ideas of social justice. 
 
Mexico’s First Reform: Decentralization (1980s) 
 Building on the above offered an analysis of the “upstream” realm of norm construction, 
the next section will examine the “downstream” domestic conditions of Mexico. International 
pressures from the World Bank and IMF combined with the weakness of country’s economy 
hindered the development of a comprehensive health system. Thus, the WHO was unable to 
catalyze and encourage the state to develop a robust health system of universal health coverage. 
The government did not localize the right to health because of its capitulation to neoliberal 
international forces, which was connected to its national political and economic limitations. 
Considering the visual analytic proposed earlier in Figure 1, the pathway from norm construction 
to implementation of UHC became blocked at various stages. 
 A federation of several states, Mexico is a large, upper-middle income country of 109 
million people with approximately half of the population below the poverty line.60 Just after the 
WHO launched the Health for All campaign, Latin America’s debt reached $327 billion by 1982 
as the debt crisis surged. Mexico was the first of several Latin American countries to default on 
its private loans. A year later, 27 more developing countries were in the process of doing the 
same.61 The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) ruled for most of the 20th century as an 
authoritarian, hegemonic political party. While some argue that the regime was less repressive 
than other Latin American countries, the government nevertheless exhibited corruption, 
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illegitimacy, and antidemocratic behavior.62 It was not until the 2000 election of Vicente Fox that 
Mexico experienced a definitive turning point for its transition to democracy.63 
The political conditions in Mexico did not provide a conducive environment for a strong 
implementation of health reform at the time when the WHO promoted Health for All either. 
Ward argues that PRI ruled the Mexican government with little concern for the social sector, 
which includes components of society like education, public health, and housing. They failed to 
institute reforms that went “beyond ‘papering over the cracks’” during the 1970s and 1980s, a 
time when the political commitment to social development waned. After 1990, it began to rise 
again. For example, in that time period the government cut total federal expenditure for the 
social sector in half.64 To further discourage the expansion of the social sector President Miguel 
de la Madrid (1982-1988) faced growing pressures for democratization, anti-ruling party 
sentiments, and fiscal reform as the debt crisis materialized. Thus, the political pressures pushed 
the Mexican government to commit to federalism rather than a system of universal social 
insurance. The lack of domestic political impetus for public health and other social services 
served as a crucial restriction on the WHO’s ability to induce policy change in Mexico. 
In terms of the economic factors that facilitate UHC development, the Mexican case 
shows how economic instability detracts from the state’s capacity to carry out reform as well. 
Over the past three decades or so, the Mexican government has taken a complicated route toward 
the current structure of its health system. In a comprehensive study of Mexican health policy, 
Homedes and Ugalde trace the waves of health reform from the 1980s to present day. They 
describe that the first health reform occurred from 1983-1994, during which neoliberal 
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ideologies and policies resulted in attempts at decentralization and privatization of health 
services in order to obtain loans from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. As the 
Mexican economy suffered in the early 1980s, the incoming international lending institutions 
demanded that the government decentralize and reduce its expenditures on health and 
education.65  
Yet soon after the imposition from the World Bank, decentralization of Mexico’s 
Ministry of Health failed for a number of reasons. Only about half of Mexico’s 31 states signed 
decentralization accords, and eventually those states that did decentralize reversed their course.66 
Most of the literature explains that decentralization reforms “failed to improve efficiency, 
increased health inequities, and had a negative impact on quality.”67 Furthermore, these efforts 
did not address the underlying problem in Mexico, the segregation of social security and 
insurance systems by financing, coverage, and eligibility.68 The Mexican health system at the 
time was designed to only guarantee the rights to health care to the certain insured, salaried 
employees and excluded the rest of the non-eligible population.69 Deeper pathologies existed 
within the health system. 
Decentralization represented one of the key health policies of the World Bank in the 
1980s, and marked the beginning of the prominent role of the Bank as key player in global health 
policymaking.70 Its policies had a detrimental effect on health systems and health outcomes. The 
Bank’s approach reflected its desire to set the normative standards for the role of public and 
private sectors, and its ability to craft policies that fit its principles and philosophical 	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understanding of development.71 Thus, the path from norm construction to localization veered 
through the channel disseminating from the World Bank, not the WHO, because of the economic 
forces of that era. With the powerful lending requirements and struggling financial state of 
affairs, a radical, comprehensive overhaul in the name of primary health care and human rights 
seemed far from the realm of possibility. 
 
IV. Progress Toward Universal Coverage: 2000-present 
In contrast to the previous events of the 1980s, the 21st century wave of health reforms 
shows a marked difference in both upstream aspects of norm construction as well as downstream 
conditions in favor of universal coverage. This section will explain how the WHO has adjusted 
its framing strategy and succeeded in leveraging new evidence to make a case for UHC. The 
WHO also has attached its agenda to those with existing legitimacy within the international pool 
of norms, such as sustainable economic development. Further, the World Bank also claims to 
promote UHC around the world today, a stark difference from its policies in the 1980s. These 
changes correlate with a rise in the number of countries implementing some sort of universal 
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Table 1. Countries undergoing reforms toward universal coverage systems as of 2012. 
Income 
Group 
Country Name Year Launched 
Low  Kenya National Hospital Insurance Fund 1966/1998 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Mandatory Health Insurance Fund 1996-2006 
Mali Mutuelles 2002/2004 
Rwanda Mutelles de Sante 2003 
Low-
middle 
Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme 2004 
India Rajiv Aarogyasri 
Rshtriya Swasthya Bima 
2007 
2008 
Indonesia Jamkesmas 2004 
Nigeria National Health Insurance System 1999/2006 
Philippines PhillHealth 1995/2005 












Brazil Unified Health System 1988/1996 
Chile National Health Fund 1979/2005 
China National Health Insurance 2009 
Columbia General System of Social Security 
in Health 
1993 
Mexico Seguro Popular 2003 
Thailand 30 Baht Scheme 2002 
South Africa National Health Insurance In process 
Estonia Estonian Health Insurance Fund 2001 
Republic of 
Korea 
National Health Insurance Program 2001 
Taiwan National Health Insurance 1995 
 Source: The Joint Learning Network 
 
Table 1 above shows countries currently undergoing reform, which does not include the reform 
waves of developed European countries during the post-World War II (1948-1973) and post-
dictatorship (1978-1986) eras.72 This table indicates the initial year UHC was launched and any 
following years in which new UHC legislation was adopted. 
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The WHO Casts a Different Vision 
In contrast to the rhetoric behind primary health care, the WHO has constructed a 
pragmatic, evidence-based frame for universal health coverage. Perhaps learning from their past 
mistakes, the WHO, a few other organizations such as the Rockefeller Center, and progressive 
international advocates have aligned this issue with the broader goals of human and economic 
development. In the following pages, this section will trace how the WHO has transmitted this 
message through three influential technical reports in particular. If Halfdan Maher took on a 
more entrepreneurial role, Margaret Chan has served as more of an international norm 
gatekeeper. While she shares the same core belief in primary health care, human rights, and 
social protection, she has adopted the issue selectively and formulated a message that presents 
the Organization’s role as a technical resource. In other words, she has selectively placed it on 
the international agenda in the way she believes is necessary. This change in tone and way of 
arguing for UHC have correlated with an increase in the number of countries engaged in 
implementation of UHC reform (Table 1). In addition to these changes within the WHO, the 
ideology of the international institutions has begun to shift to some degree as well, also aiding 
the ability for UHC to gain traction.  
The WHO’s attempts to refrain from presenting itself as political in nature helped it 
regain legitimacy, but also yielded mixed results. The first major step in raising global awareness 
of health systems resulted from the controversial 2000 World Health Systems Report. The WHO 
ranked the world’s health systems on the basis of several contested indicators, such as 
responsiveness and fairness in financial contribution. This report even described the previous 
primary health care programs as “at least partial failures” in most cases. It called for a policy 
framework of “new universalism” based on “cost effectiveness” for everyone, including the 
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poor. Given its questionable methodologies and choice to place United States as 37th in the world 
for overall health system performance, this report set off a firestorm of criticism.73 Regardless of 
the content of such debates, “the greatest achievement of the World Health Report was to place 
health systems performance on the political agenda. While some countries that fared poorly in 
the rankings simply ignored them, others commissioned research to discover reasons for their 
poor performance.”74 In other words, this report catalyzed action by adding health systems to the 
international discourse. In 2010, the WHO released Health Systems Financing: the Path to 
Universal Health Coverage, one of the most important WHO documents in the last decade.75 
Since it published the report, 60 countries have approached the WHO with requests for technical 
support on how to best reform their health systems.76 
Margaret Chan’s tactics provide an instructive example of how norm gatekeepers select 
issues and ideas to promote. Carpenter describes that through its selection processes, gatekeepers 
may try to “reframe an issue in a way suitable to the gatekeeper, allowing it to forestall advocacy 
frames that would undermine its own work.” This allows the gatekeeper to sustain its “privileged 
position in the issue creation process.”77 As the voice of the organization, Chan has used her role 
to reinforce its apolitical stance. She has used her prominence in high-profile settings to 
characterize the WHO as a resource rather than an activist organization. In describing UHC at 
the 2012 World Health Assembly, she said, “This is not rocket science. This is frugal, strategic 
innovation that sets out to develop a game-changing intervention, and makes ease of use and 
affordable price explicit objectives.” Chan’s goal of better “health financing” is quite different 
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from Mahler’s “social revolution”—the language of the WHO emits a mechanical tone for a 
reason. Despite recognizing that “UHC is a practical expression of society’s concern for health 
equity,” she realizes that the UHC movement needs “to argue strongly, but not emotionally.”78 In 
contrast to Mahler’s missionary zeal, Chan proposes UHC as a common sense matter of 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
The WHO has built its case for UHC also through its connection to The Lancet, one of 
the world’s leading journals for medicine and public health. Together, the WHO and the Lancet 
hosted a launch event for a special Lancet series focused on UHC. The series argues for UHC as 
a matter of practicality and economic development, and marshals the voices of leading 
intellectual figures in global health. Rather than make ideological claims, they present an 
argument based on pragmatism. Jeffrey Sachs, a leading economist in the field of development, 
writes that low-income countries can also take part. Stating that “good health” is “good 
economics,” the authors use issue concordance to link the UHC agenda to the broader prosperity 
of society down to the level of individual families.79 The advocates use data, now possible with 
the monitoring and evaluation tools not present for the primary health care campaign, to 
strengthen their claims. For example, they cite the fact that out-of-pocket fees for health services 
push 100 million people below the poverty line ever year,80 in addition to much more specific 
information about the benefits of universal coverage. The coupling of the UHC agenda to both 
the human and sustainable development agenda provides a stronger source of resonance with 
powerful actors than the rights-based argument alone.  
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Signs of Change at the World Bank 
Although the nature of norm construction has varied considerably from PHC, the position 
of the World Bank and the international context in which this norm has been re-constructed has 
also changed. In a presentation in January 2012, the Director of the Health, Nutrition, and 
Population arm of the World Bank stated that health financing and universal coverage are now 
one of the priorities for the Bank.81 It has developed a program called Universal Health Coverage 
Challenge Program that will aid in “developing knowledge and operational tools to help 
countries pursue universal coverage and manage fiscal, efficiency and equity challenges and 
risks.” The views of David de Ferranti, a World Bank economist, illustrate the shift that seems to 
be occurring in the World Bank’s and other financial institutions. In the 1980s, de Ferranti 
strongly argued for user fees. Since then, he has become an outspoken voice against user fees 
and for the UHC campaign.82 
The World Bank even serves as a partner and funder for some of the major UHC research 
and organizational hubs, such as the Joint Learning Network and Results for Development 
Institute. This represents a sharp divergence from the structural adjustment programs of the 
1980s and 1990s, the time period when PHC was launched. Although rhetoric by no means 
implies reality, these changes within the World Bank reflect a significant transition. Apart from 
its policy on UHC, the Bank has integrated new principles of state ownership, community 
participation, and multi-sector collaboration—these strategies indicate a divergence from its past 
approach and in fact sound similar to the original PHC campaign. In general, “The Bank’s 
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approach to global health over the last ten years presents a transition towards a more ‘soft 
politics’ form of engagement.”83  
 Relative to the period in the 1980s, both the World Bank and the U.S. seem to have 
pursued a softer approach. In contrast to the fear of the Heritage Foundation’s earlier reports on 
the WHO, the U.S. seems to lack an explicit rejection of UHC. According to the Council on 
Foreign Relations, the U.S. government has worked for many years to help countries attain 
UHC.84 Policymakers in the U.S. seem to accept or even encourage universal health coverage 
abroad, as long as it does not take place at home. Some tension persists, however. According to 
Global Health Watch, “the US in particular continually pressurizes WHO to…avoid such 
terminology as ‘the right to health.’”85 Nevertheless, the wave of UHC across the world may 
reflect a decline in U.S. legitimacy with regard to health in particular, especially given the 
debates over the Obama administration’s Affordable Care Act. As the World Bank moves farther 
away from the policies of the 1980s and 90s, the normative authority of the U.S. with regard to 
health remains in question, and the WHO strengthens its argument for UHC, a variety of 
countries continue to embark on a course of health reform. Mexico’s development of UHC will 
illustrate how these factors played out at the state level. 
 
Mexico’s Seguro Popular: UHC (2003-2012)  
 In contrast to the early attempts at decentralization in the 1980s, the more recent era of 
Mexico’s history demonstrates how the WHO was able to push its agenda for UHC in Mexico 
given a different set of political and economic circumstances. Now that Mexico has achieved the 
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status of an upper-middle income country,86 financing a transition to UHC became more feasible. 
This has created the space for a new concept of protection and ability to respond to the agenda 
that the WHO set forth. This combination of a redefined, evidence-based UHC agenda and new 
economic possibilities has facilitated the development of UHC in Mexico. The political situation 
changed and provided an important political opportunity; in 2000, the PRI lost to the Partido de 
Acción Nacional (PAN) after a 70-year long rule. Julio Frenk was appointed Minister of Health 
and became a key figure who synthesized these converging factors to launch a health reform 
program called Seguro Popular in 2003.87 In 2003, 50% of health expenditures were out-of-
pocket. Yet after 9 years of implementation, the country has achieved UHC and incorporated 
52.6 million Mexicans into a public insurance scheme.88 SP has replaced the previous 
employment-based model that favored salaried workers. It marks a social and conceptual shift 
from “labour-market-based social security” to “social protection of health, the universal right of 
access to effective health care.”89 Despite any shortcomings the program might have as a method 
of health delivery, the international community deems Mexico as an important part of the UHC 
global movement as both an advocate and example of successful health policy. 
The modified rhetoric of the WHO also shaped the Mexican path toward reform. In 
numerous publications and evaluations of their own health reform, policymakers in Mexico cite 
the strong importance of global evidence as a catalyst for priority-setting, national health reform, 
and implementation of SP.90 They assert that their poor ranking in the 2000 World Health Report 
served as a motivating factor for change. The poor rank in the report, combined with increased 
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research and data conducted  “catalyzed more in-depth country-level analysis.” Eventually, 
rankings and research became political tools. The constituencies in favor of UHC gained new 
information from this report that helped them advocate at a moment of political opportunity, 
right before the change in administration. As the WHO linked UHC to development, the 
Mexican Ministry of Health followed because they recognized the power of linking their own 
health reform with international normative networks.91 The WHO wielded power in influencing 
the development of SP, in effect demonstrating how its frame of technicality became the 
language of Mexican policymakers. Frenk and Gómez-Dantés make an astute point about the use 
of apolitical technicalities as a method to promote political beliefs. When describing SP, they 
explain that 
the Mexican model may be seen as an option to reconcile two extremes: the selective 
technocratic approach to the distribution of health care, which provides practical 
alternatives but purports to be morally neutral, and the rights-based approach, which has 
a strong value foundation but has lacked operational support.92 
 
Therefore, both Mexican policymakers and the WHO share a similar strategy in promoting a 
global agenda for UHC. This has arisen through specific political calculations and thought 
processes. 
The multitude of papers about Seguro Popular almost all feature the voice of Julio Frenk, 
whose essential political strategies receive far less attention than Mexico’s evidence-based 
narrative. Frenk became the Dean of the Harvard School of Public Health in 2009, and 
previously held an executive position at the WHO in 1998. He also worked for the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation. Frenk has achieved a level of global health stardom that may also 
motivate his desire to ensure that Mexico’s reform fulfills its purpose. Because of he seems to 
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have discovered how to earn respect in global health circles, he has been able to serve as a 
leading voice and advocate for the WHO’s normative agenda. Frenk co-authored a piece in The 
New York Times with David de Ferranti about the value of universal coverage in which they 
explain the need to link health to other societal concerns like political stability, job creation, 
economic growth.93 Frenk recognizes the political power of framing and issue concordance in 
agenda setting. This part of Mexico’s path to UHC is key to understanding how norm 
localization occurs, because it shows a degree of international and state interaction. 
While the focus on social services declined in the 1980s, Julio Frenk raised health on the 
national political agenda through politics. Although focusing on any single individual is 
sometimes a dangerous analytical approach for political science, Stuckler et al cite the salient 
position of health ministers as agents of political change. Research shows that ministers of health 
can “shift the terms of the debate to gain support for change by showing that existing, non-
universal, systems are failing” and “basing their arguments on the availability of evidence and 
the likely resonance of issues with other key stakeholders.”94 The “evidence” account of change 
in Mexico, however, deemphasizes the “politically astute set of tactics” that Frenk employed to 
build a coalition in favor of health reform. Throughout his campaign, the Ministry of Health 
conflicted with the Ministry of Finance to the point that the Health worked with the president’s 
office to marginalize Finance. Another source of opposition came from individual states, the left-
wing party (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) who desired a national health service, and 
even the Mexican people who did not want to pay. Thus, Frenk had to use various tactics to 
overcome these issues and implement UHC.  
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Throughout the long process of health reform in Mexico, Frenk and other Mexican 
officials have championed the UHC cause in conjunction with the WHO. As evidenced by their 
relationship, this case reveals how gatekeeping institutions and state officials find mutual interest 
in collectively propagating their messages together. In April of 2012, the Mexican government 
hosted a high-profile event for universal coverage called “The International Forum on Sustaining 
Universal Health Coverage: Sharing Experiences and Supporting Progress.” At the conference, 
Margaret Chan gave a laudatory speech, saying that Mexico “gives the world an outstanding 
example of what can be achieved through high-level political commitment.”95 Conveying their 
leadership in this movement, Mexico adopted a formal declaration on UHC for the participating 
member countries at the forum. Thus, Mexico gains praise on the international stage as the WHO 
continues to strengthen its campaign and sustain its own legitimacy. 
The neoliberal restrictions that existed in the 1980s no longer inhibit Mexico’s 
implementation, either. The World Bank in fact started funding a project to support Seguro 
Popular titled, “Support for the Social Protection System in Health” to expand coverage and 
strengthen the public sector’s capacity for health reform.96 The U.S. and Mexico’s relationship 
involves issues like immigration, drugs, and organized crime, but the U.S. remains passive with 
regard to health. The U.S. participated in the International Forum as well, but wrote a convoluted 
“explanation note” that simultaneously praised Mexico’s efforts, recognized the universal right 
to health, and exempted themselves from it.97 While the underlying dynamics of this relationship 
require further research, it seems that the U.S. then plans to remain uninvolved in the UHC 
campaign in Mexico. Although a realist critique would position the U.S. as a hegemonic power 
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seeking to influence Mexico’s policymaking, the U.S. seems to have taken a more inactive 
approach. There are various potential reasons for this, such as the fact that Mexico first adopted 
UHC at a period of U.S. ascendancy. Thus, perhaps the nature of Mexico’s health system did not 
pose a threat to U.S. power. Another possibility is that the U.S. acceptance of Seguro Popular 
reflects improving U.S.-Mexico relations. The Economist recently argued that the U.S. should 
seek partnership with its neighbor,98 and even highlighted the progress of SP.99 
 The Mexican case reveals lessons about how institutions such as the WHO and the state 
can align to frame and actually institutionalize a particular normative agenda. While the 
government had previously found itself in economic crisis and dependency on international 
lending, modern circumstances enabled a different outcome to occur through the political tactics 
of Frenk and the Ministry of Health. Considering this example, the next section will turn to the 
broader implications for this study. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 The original question posed in this paper asked why the idea of universal health coverage 
has swept the globe and gained traction in countries from such various economic and political 
backgrounds. While a simple answer would provide a nice theoretical device, the research shows 
that the reality of the world presents a much more complex story of how universal health 
coverage has developed. Rather than identify a singular determinant, I have argued that a number 
of factors converge to bring about health reform. This involves global and local forces, which 
exist in a dynamic transnational relationship with each other. 
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 In the initial stages of norm production, the WHO serves as a central international actor 
with the power to both define issues or problems from within (like norm entrepreneurs) and set 
calculated agendas (like norm gatekeepers). From 1978-1980s, the WHO attempted a highly 
politicized campaign that failed to realize its original vision because of framing issues and 
competing neoliberal ideologies. By the turn of the century, the WHO had learned to assume a 
more technical mandate to legitimize their case for UHC, and softened its promotion of it as a 
social justice issue. This strategy proved more advantageous by resonating with other economic 
development arguments, and countries like Mexico soon approached the WHO to assist its 
evidence-based policymaking. This contrast between outcomes, given the constant core set of 
values about human rights, reveals how important the strategic act of framing and transmitting a 
normative agenda is to the success of that agenda. Ideas become redesigned and change over 
time, rather than simply succeed or fail to complete the norm life cycle. 
 The manner in which countries absorb international norms and put them into practice 
depends on a range of conditions that may help or hinder norm localization. In the 1980s, 
political and economic constraints discouraged the implementation of universal coverage in 
many developing countries in particular. By the 2000s, however, governments began to harness 
the political and economic potential to reform their health systems. Freed from the neoliberal 
policies of the 1980s, Mexico translated its rights-based ideals into a UHC system though 
political tactics and close engagement with the WHO. This example offers a salient lesson about 
norms in local contexts—that domestic conditions are not static states of being, but also depend 
on the agency and initiative of local players. This argument offers a more optimistic outlook on 
how political change occurs, because it shows that historical conditions do not predetermine the 
fate of a country. The concept of how international norms become mobilized at local levels is 
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part of a much larger discussion of power dynamics and the ability for states and organizations to 
coalesce around shared ideals and sound policymaking. The global health regime operates 
through a complicated body of international actors and institutions, but achieving lasting impact 
requires the commitment of the local government. In the end, states guarantee human rights, 
including the right to health, and translate international agendas into action.  
To further examine the rise of UHC, an increase in political science research to fill the 
current gap would benefit our understanding of how health system reform may take shape in the 
future. This paper is limited in scope, because it does not provide an explanation for health 
reform to universal health systems that spans history. Another limitation of this paper is that it 
selects a case of success, as Mexico provides a quintessential example of the reform process and 
implementation of UHC. Studies on cases of failure that have occurred recently, in which the 
WHO promoted a similar agenda but failed to push a country to implement UHC, would add an 
instructive complement to the research presented in this paper. One such example could be the 
United States, but another emerging middle-income country would likely provide a more 
relevant comparison. An additional valuable research study to conduct could consist of a detailed 
examination of the World Bank’s involvement in universal health coverage policy in recent 
years. The Bank serves as a significant driver of global health policy and its action with regard to 
UHC will continue to shape the momentum building around the world. 
 
Defining the Future of Global Health 
The transition to universal coverage represents a critical moment for the international 
community. The end of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015 should prompt a critical 
reflection on the past successes and failures, and must usher in different strategies to alleviate 
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poverty and promote human rights. If UHC continues to gain momentum in the next few years, it 
has the potential to inform the next major global development agenda. Technical research on the 
most effective practices and models of UHC in terms of health equity, access, and ability to 
improve health outcomes need to guide future discourse. Evidence and input from the emerging 
nations and the grassroots at the forefront of this movement must also become part of the agenda 
setting process. Many challenges and potential pitfalls exist, such as lack of donor funding to 
help nations achieve UHC. Gaps in the other areas of health systems like a shortage in the global 
health care workforce will continue to hinder the quality of health systems. These and other 
serious challenges will require policymakers to solve problems and form new ways of designing 
health care. Although it is only one part of the wider global health agenda, the idea of UHC is 
powerful enough to serve as an umbrella development goal for the post-2015 years. It must 
synergize with other existing structures and issue-specific agendas–the two are not mutually 
exclusive and can achieve maximum impact if leveraged together. 
The global movement toward UHC may signal the beginning of an international 
framework that refocuses on the structural mechanisms to address the root causes of poverty and 
illness, rather than just individual health issues. Better health financing is a part of the greater 
health system, and is not a panacea for systemic health issues. But it is one method of addressing 
the root cause of poverty as a barrier to health care. While the future of the UHC movement is 
uncertain, the evolving discourse about the responsibilities of states and the general population to 
each other—coupled with the right kind of action—marks a tremendous step forward for the 
well-being of people everywhere. Reforms that address the entire health system are difficult, 
tedious, and politically complex, but the potential for sustainable transformations of how people 
access health care could potentially change the face of global health. At its core, the global 
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transition to UHC reflects the normalization of the deeper philosophical belief that everyone 
deserves to thrive regardless of circumstance. The shift toward universal health coverage merits 
the world’s utmost attention, because it signifies a path forward that encourages governments to 
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